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Abstract 
Wittgenstein has been considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century while being 
one of its most popular mystics. Considering the staunch secularization of philosophy during the 
Enlightenment, such combination is rarely seen in philosophers of more recent times. The farthest 
explication of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his mysticism has not went as 
far as making a Christian nature explicit. This can be read as analytic philosophy’s identification as 
an heir to the Enlightenment. There has been much ink spilled in the mystical aspects of his 
philosophy. Although there are hints of his Christian leanings, patent parallelisms have yet to be 
drawn properly. Exploring Christian faith and rule-following, this paper asserts that the former is 
how the latter is characterized in the Philosophical Investigations. Faith and rule-following both 




The question of meaning in life has intentionally been left out in the analytic 
literature. But recent years have seen the demise of this tendency of analytic 
philosophy. Part of those to be blamed for this tendency is Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the unfortunate positivistic interpretation of his earlier work.1 As one of the 
greatest minds of the 20th century, his pronouncement of the nonsensicality of 
the question meant its exclusion in succeeding discourses. 
But such tendency has changed in recent years. For the past twenty or thirty 
years, the analytic literature has seen a surge in the number of philosophers 
taking up the question.2 Analytic philosophers have also began taking up 
metaphysical questions—a field largely discredited by early analytic philosophy. 
The discussion of religion per se in the analytic literature has also been rare, 
if not absent. This is not the tendency at all especially during the Middle Ages. It 
was when a lot (if not all) philosophers were religious, coming from the 
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Christian, Jewish, and Moslem sorts.3 The Enlightenment, however, managed to 
wipe out such close connection between religion and philosophy. As anti-clerical 
sentiment grew during that time, so did anti-religious sentiments.4 I do not 
mean to say that there are no discussions on the philosophy of religion (for 
indeed there are plenty). This dropping out consists of a more secular approach 
to religiosity. But as analytic philosophy has changed in recent years, it is 
conceivable that religious discourse can again come back into the philosophical 
scene. 
As heirs to the Enlightenment, analytic philosophy missed out a lot of 
Christian tendencies in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. Indeed, his Christian tendencies 
have manifested in his personal life. But whether there are Christian themes in 
his works is seldom talked about. 
In this paper, I will draw out one Christian aspect of his later work, the 
Philosophical Investigations. I will be drawing a parallel between faith and the 
discussion on rule-following in the Investigations, asserting that the latter is how 
Christianity understands the former. It seems that how rules are followed sheds 
light into how faith is conceived by Christianity. 
I do not wish to assert that Wittgenstein in his person is Christian and that 
his religious leaning is the reason why there is a Christian theme in the 
Investigations. These two assertions could be the topic of an altogether different 
project. What I intend to assert is the Christianity of the Investigations as a text, 
highlighting the similarity between Christian faith and rule-following. 
 
2. Christian Faith 
 
The relationship between faith and reason has always been the subject of a 
plethora of debates ever since Christianity and philosophy met. But in this paper, 
I will be focusing my discussion on faith itself, and not on the usual discussion 
of its relationship with reason. To avoid controversy on the Christianity of the 
“faith” to be discussed in this paper, I have chosen to cite the Magisterium5 of 
the Catholic Church. This only means that the principal sources of this section’s 
discussion will be from the teachings sanctioned by the Church herself. This 
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does not mean to discredit philosophical discussions of it like Kierkegaard’s. It 
may be admitted that these non-canonical discussions are helpful.  
Observing that the two terms are almost interchangeable in the Bible, 
Benedict XVI conflates faith with hope.6 Drawing from Paul’s letter to the 
Romans, the title of the Pope’s encyclical, Spe Salvi, suggests such conflation. It 
comes from a larger biblical phrase, “Spe salvi facti sumus,” or “In hope we are 
saved.”7 As it seems impossible to be saved without faith, with this conflation, 
it now seems impossible to be saved without hope. It follows that Christian faith 
is hope.  
In another letter, Paul talks about how before Christ, there was no hope.8 
Hence, Christians believe that it is only after Christ that they started to hope. It 
is through an encounter with the divine that an individual gains hope, thereby 
gaining faith. Benedict XVI talks about faith as letting the faithful “share in 
Jesus’ vision.”9 Faith, therefore, provides a way of seeing. 
This encounter gives the Christian the evidence that she needs for things that 
she believes in. The Letter to the Hebrews gives this very notion: “Faith is the 
hypostasis of things hoped for; the proof of things not seen.”10 Hypostasis here, 
is believed to be the central word of the verse by many exegetes today. It is 
translated in Latin as substantia.11 This points to how faith makes present things 
that have yet to be present. It is the substance of these soon-to-be-present things. 
Hence, with faith, things hoped for are just as real as things that are in front of 
one’s eyes. 
Taken this way, faith seems to be an epistemological device. But Benedict 
XVI points out that faith is not purely informative but performative. It is not a 
function of the mind to gain faith in Christ but the function of the whole 
individual: 
 
That means: the Gospel is not merely a communication of things that can 
be known—it is one that makes things happen and is life-changing. The 
one who has hope lives differently; the one who hopes has been granted 
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the gift of a new life.12 
 
Here, faith does not give the Christian a theoretical knowledge but a practical 
one. This distinction goes back to Aristotle, in his distinction between the moral 
and intellectual virtues.13 In a way, faith comes close to giving us phronesis, or 
practical wisdom. 
Gustavo Gutierrez points out that action, for Christians, is not a product of 
theological reflection of their faith. Action comes directly from faith and it is 
only afterwards that theology can come into play.14 For instance, no one had to 
tell the martyrs to die before they deny their faith in Christ. A thorough 
theological background is not necessary to become a martyr. The mere presence 
of faith is enough to lead one to act in a certain way. Faith, therefore, is a 
sufficient condition for action. 
In this brief section, I have characterized faith in two ways: 
 
(1) Faith provides a way of seeing 
(2) Faith is a sufficient condition for action. 
 
I propose that both of these characteristics are present in the discussion of 
rule-following in the Investigations. Moreover, (2) is a consequence of (1). 





3.1. Providing a way of seeing 
 
The Tractarian pronouncement that the “limits of my language are the limits 
of my world”15 still rings true, in a certain sense, in the Investigations. His 
discussion of color-terms, for instance, reduces the redness of red to a function 
of language. When asked how he knew that something is red, he simply replied 
that he learned English.16 This should not be read as an endorsement of a 
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relativism of sorts. This only means that when we see something as X, it is a rule 
that gives us the term to refer to X as X. 
In this sense, rules provide a way of seeing as much as faith does. One only 
sees a red rose as red because English calls it such. This is also why a dog can be 
said to be afraid of being beaten by his master while we cannot say that the dog 
is afraid of being beaten by his master tomorrow.17 The rules that dogs follow in 
their dog-game do not allow for a concept of tomorrow. Because of these rules, 
therefore, a dog sees his master’s beating in a certain way. This way excludes the 
possibility of expecting it to happen tomorrow. 
In the same vein, Christ’s dying on the cross can either be seen as salvific or 
mundane. It is because of faith that it can be seen as the former, otherwise it 
would just be the mundane death of an ambitious son of a carpenter.  
  
3.1.1. Rules and aspect perception 
 
The previous section certainly recalls Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect 
perception. A brief caesura on aspect perception is therefore in order. 
The discussion of aspect perception was included in what was traditionally 
known as Part II of the Investigations. The most recent edition, however, no 
longer distinguishes between the two parts of the Investigations. The editors 
thought that the addition of Part II was an unqualified, arbitrary decision by 
Anscombe and Rhees.18 The Investigations that is being talked about in this 
paper, therefore, only refers to what was traditionally known as Part I. 
But for the sake of clarity of concepts, I think that there is still a need to 
discuss aspect perception in relation to the overall project of this paper. This 
section will clarify the relationship among the concepts of aspect perception, 
rules, and faith. 
Fronda succinctly describes how aspect perception works: 
 
However it may be, it takes an attitude to see-as. Transposing this theme 
to a much grander scale one would have thus: what one recognizes in a 
phenomenon or cluster of phenomena is a function of one’s attitude. And 
a difference in attitude between two subjects observing the same 
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phenomenon makes two distinct recognitions of it.19 
 
It is because of a certain attitude that one is led to see certain aspects.20 
Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit example, for instance, illustrates how a 
certain attitude could predispose one to see it solely as a duck, or solely as a 
rabbit. 21  Here, the same duck-rabbit datum is being perceived but the 
recognitions differ. No recognition can be argued for as the correct one. 
It is therefore clear that to see a certain aspect is not a well-thought out 
decision.22 The seeing of an aspect just suddenly dawns on one. This dawning 
then enables one to see the aspect continuously thereafter.23 
Aspect perception is clearly provided for by rules. These rules dictate how 
one will see a certain datum. The difference in rules adopted only means 
difference in attitude. And difference in attitude means difference in recognition. 
The rules governing an attitude, dawns on one in a phenomenon called an 
aspect dawning. The gaining of faith, therefore, is an aspect dawning. What 
dawns on one is a form of seeing-as governed by certain rules. And because 
faith has been gained, one can now see things in the light of faith. 
This relationship among aspect perception, rules, and faith is best illustrated 
by the story of the conversion of Paul. On his way to Damascus to prosecute 
Christians, “a light from the sky suddenly flashed around him.”24 This light 
blinded him and it is only after being baptized by Ananias that his sight was 
restored.25 
Paul’s experience in Damascus saw a dramatic aspect-dawning. It is because 
of that experience that he began to gain faith. This newly dawned faith has 
provided him with rules governing his new way of seeing things, exemplified by 
the restoration of his sight. It is now in accordance with these rules that he 
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3.2. Sufficient for action 
 
Faith conceived as sufficient for action is laconically clarified by 
Wittgenstein’s discussion on rules. In this way, Christian faith is very much 
similar to how Wittgenstein conceived of rule-following. 
Following a rule for Wittgenstein is not an intellectual activity. He claims 
that learning a language is mastering a technique.27 Following linguistic rules is 
therefore a skill. The best way to illustrate this is through a comparison with 
swimming. One does not learn how to swim by pure intellection of all the 
guidelines on how to swim. One learns how to swim through engaging with the 
activity of swimming itself.28 The same is true in rule-following. If one only 
thinks that she follows a rule, she does not really.29 
Rule-following, therefore, is inherently performative, as much as faith is. It 
is not constituted in thinking about all the applications of a rule in advance as if 
it were an algorithm. 30  Wittgenstein compares this misconception of 
rule-following to a machine. As a machine has algorithms which it follows, so 
do human beings. A rule can be likened to a machine’s algorithms. But, says 
Wittgenstein, this analogy does not take into account the possibility of the 
machine breaking down. The algorithm would not be able to salvage the 
machine in its application of the rule. 31  Rule-following, therefore, is not 
constituted by an algorithm. 
This is precisely why rule-following is not a mental activity but an act. As 
one constantly applies a rule the same way, there seems to be a decision in every 
application of the rule.32 This conception of rule-following goes into the grain 
of Wittgenstein’s battle cry in the Investigations: “Don’t think but look!”33 
Wittgenstein, however, says elsewhere, “Theology as grammar.”34 This 
pronouncement is very obscure as it does not explicitly use the copula. This 
immediately follows a brief assertion that “grammar tells what kind of object 
anything is,” in the same section. Other scholars take this to consider theology 
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and all god-talk as purely grammatical.35 This is a strong assertion. But what I 
would like to point out is only the connection of this section with how Gutierrez 
places theology with faith. 
It is grammar that specifies the essence of the object36 and theology is 
grammar. Object, therefore, comes first before grammar can specify its essence. 
This is very much like how faith-led action comes first before theology can 





This paper was able to assert that Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
rule-following in the Investigations is how Christianity understands faith: (1) it 
provides a way of seeing, and (2) it is a sufficient condition for action. Because 
of drawing up this connection, a correlation between Wittgenstein’s religious 
convictions and his philosophy is, at most, hinted at. 
Wittgenstein was quoted saying that he was “strongly affected by 
[Nietzsche’s] hostility against Christianity.”38 Alain Badiou, however, does not 
read this as a confession of the Christian faith. Such remark, as Badiou reads it, 
is a confession of an eternal, unspeakable sense of the world which is not 
necessarily Christian.39 Elsewhere, Wittgenstein is quoted saying that he cannot 
help but see things in a religious point of view.40 
Badiou may or may not be correct. But whether this religiosity is indeed 
Christian is an altogether different question. Whatever the correct interpretation 
of these remarks may be, they are enough to prove his religiosity.   
Wittgenstein is known to be very keen on the tiniest details of his drafts of 
the Investigations. Therefore, the patent parallelisms drawn in this paper should 
not be seen as coincidental. This opens up an avenue for tracing more Christian 
themes in the Philosophical Investigations, the question of Wittgenstein’s own 
religious convictions, and the relationship between the two.  
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